22 May 2015

SC of #Health confirms fourth #MERS-CoV #case in #Qatar (Gulf Times, May 22 2015)

[Source: Gulf Times, full page: (LINK).]

SCH confirms fourth Mers case in Qatar [      ]

9:21 PM – 22 May  2015

Doha - A 73 year-old Qatari man has been diagnosed with Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (Mers-CoV) infection, the Supreme Council of Health (SCH) confirmed. This is the fourth Mers-CoV case in Qatar this year. The third case, a 29 year-old expatriate employed at a camel farm in Qatar, was announced by SCH on Thursday.




#FAO works with #partners and member #countries for the effective #monitoring and #prevention of #MERS at the #human-animal interface (FAO, May 22 2015)

[Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, full page: (LINK).]

FAO works with partners and member countries for the effective monitoring and prevention of MERS at the human-animal interface [      ][      ]

22 May 2015

In light of the efforts to better understand the dynamics of the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS) at the human-animal interface and to elucidate the role of camels in the epidemiology of MERS as a potential source of infection, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and Qatar, in collaboration with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the World Health Organization (WHO), convened a Regional Workshop on MERS and One Health in Doha, Qatar on 27–29 April 2015. This is the second consultation on MERS in animals in the region after the first meeting in Oman in May 2014, co-organized by FAO and Oman.

The meeting aims to assess the current situation of the disease, to present existing knowledge on the potential role of animal species in the epidemiological cycle of MERS and to make recommendations for improving the surveillance, prevention and control of MERS at the human-animal interface.

Stepping up intraregional and global cooperation was also at the centre of discussions during the meeting.

The Government of Qatar’s Supreme Council of Health and the Ministry of the Environment hosted the meeting.

About 100 participants from 10 countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates) were brought together, in addition to selected MERS experts from the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Erasmus Medical Center (the Netherlands), the University of Hong Kong, the Australian Animal Health Laboratory (CSIRO, Australia), the Centre de Coopération en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD, France) and representatives from OIE and WHO.

Representatives from FAO Subregional Office for the Gulf Cooperation Council States and Yemen (SNG), FAO Regional Office for the Near East and North Africa, Egypt (RNE) and FAO Headquarters were also in attendance. Participants included Chief Veterinary Officers and technical staff from veterinary services, as well public health officials.

The meeting included presentations from the invited MERS experts, FAO, WHO and OIE on the state of knowledge about MERS in humans and animals, and One Health practices.

Representatives from the participating countries outlined the history and status of MERS from the public health and veterinary perspectives.

Presentations from the most affected countries revealed the active engagement of veterinary authorities in animal investigations as well as enthusiasm to address specific issues of MERS in camel populations for a better understanding of the infection at the human-animal interface.

A session was dedicated to the One Health approach and practices in relation to MERS in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

There was extensive debate about the technical and regulatory aspects of MERS in animals including surveillance of the virus in camels, the management of MERS-positive animals on farms and at slaughterhouses, as well as the border inspection of imported animals into GCC countries.

The main outcomes of the meeting were summarized in the Doha declaration, agreed by all participants.

This declaration provides guidance and best practices in relation to

  • (i) surveillance of MERS in animals,
  • (ii) food safety and the environment,
  • (iii) risk communication,
  • (iv) research needs and
  • (v) regional and intersectoral collaboration.

The meeting was considered successful as evident from the active participation of the attendees, the expert level of discussions and pertinent contributions from all parties in the meeting’s final statement.



#Ideological #Anachronism Involving #Needle and #Syringe #Exchange Programs. Lessons From the #Indiana #HIV #Outbreak (JAMA, extract)

[Source: Journal of the American Medical Association, full page: (LINK). Extract.]

Online First / Viewpoint | May 22, 2015

Ideological Anachronism Involving Needle and Syringe Exchange ProgramsLessons From the Indiana HIV Outbreak [      ]


Josiah D. Rich, MD, MPH1,2; Eli Y. Adashi, MD, MS2,3

JAMA. Published online May 22, 2015. doi:10.1001/jama.2015.6303


On March 26, 2015, Governor Mike Pence of Indiana issued an executive order declaring a state of public health emergency in Scott County with an eye toward stemming the largest-ever HIV outbreak in the state. Evolving over 2 months, the HIV outbreak involved 153 confirmed cases and has been traced to extensive needle sharing by people who inject drugs.1 Most of the confirmed HIV cases were associated with the intravenous use of a liquefied form of the opioid agonist oxymorphone (a Schedule II controlled substance) otherwise marketed as an extended-release tablet (Opana). Methamphetamine and heroin have been implicated as well. Concurrently, Governor Pence authorized a renewable short-term (30-day) needle and syringe exchange program (NSEP), the scope of which was to be delimited to Scott County. In so doing, Governor Pence temporarily overrode 3 drug paraphernalia state laws criminalizing the possession and distribution of sterile syringes. This Viewpoint describes federal and state syringe access policies, explores their attendant ideological backdrop, and points out their role in the eruption and amplification of avoidable HIV outbreaks.




#Ebola #vaccine #trial in #Guinea (The Lancet, extract)

[Source: The Lancet, full page: (LINK). Extract.]


Ebola vaccine trial in Guinea [      ]

John-Arne Røttingen, on behalf of 27 signatories

Published Online: 22 May 2015 / Publication stage: In Press Corrected Proof / DOI:

© 2015 World Health Organization. Published by Elsevier Ltd/Inc/BV. All rights reserved.



We wish to comment on and rectify claims that were made in Miriam Shuchman's World Report1 concerning the Ebola vaccination trial in Guinea.




#Synergistic #Effect of S224P and N383D #Substitutions in the #PA of #H5N1 #Avian #Influenza #Virus Contributes to #Mammalian #Adaptation (Scientific Reports, abstract, edited)

[Source: Scientific Reports, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Scientific Reports / Article / Open

Synergistic Effect of S224P and N383D Substitutions in the PA of H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus Contributes to Mammalian Adaptation [   R   ]

Jiasheng Song, Jing Xu, Jianzhong Shi, Yanbing Li & Hualan Chen

Journal name: Scientific Reports - Volume: 5, Article number: 10510 - DOI: doi:10.1038/srep10510

Received 29 January 2015 - Accepted 17 April 2015 – Published  22 May 2015



The adaptation of H5N1 avian influenza viruses to human poses a great threat to public health. Previous studies indicate the adaptive mutations in viral polymerase of avian influenza viruses are major contributors in overcoming the host species barrier, with the majority of mammalian adaptive mutations occurring in the PB2 protein. However, the adaptive mutations in the PA protein of the H5N1 avian influenza virus are less defined and poorly understood. In this study, we identified the synergistic effect of the PA/224P + 383D of H5N1 avian influenza viruses and its ability to enhance the pathogenicity and viral replication in a mammalian mouse model. Interestingly, the signature of PA/224P + 383D mainly exists in mammalian isolates of the H5N1 influenza virus and pdmH1N1 influenza virus, providing a potential pathway for the natural adaptation to mammals which imply the effects of natural adaptation to mammals. Notably, the mutation of PA/383D, which is highly conserved in avian influenza viruses, increases the polymerase activity in both avian and human cells, and may have roles in maintaining the avian influenza virus in their avian reservoirs, and jumping species to infect humans.

Subject terms: Influenza virus • Viral pathogenesis



#France, #Grippe. Sur #surmortalité #record de plus de 18 000 #décès (Ouest France, May 22 2015)

[Source: Ouest France, full page: (LINK).]

Grippe. Sur surmortalité record de plus de 18 000 décès [      ]

Il s'agit de l'excès de mortalité le plus élevé depuis la mise en place du système d'évaluation de l'excès de décès hivernal, c'est-à-dire depuis l'hiver 2006-2007. Dominée par des virus A/H3N2 (dont une partie n'était pas couverte par le vaccin), l'épidémie a conduit 2,9 millions de personnes à...




S. #Korean #woman confirmed infected with #killer #tick #virus [#SFTS ?](YonhapNews, May 22 2015)

[Source: Yonhap, full page: (LINK).]

S. Korean woman confirmed infected with killer tick virus [      ]

SEOUL, May 22 (Yonhap) -- A South Korean woman has been confirmed to be infected by the killer tick virus, the first such case this year, the health authorities said Friday. The 73-year-old woman living in a rural city in South Chungcheong Province …




#Epidemiological #update: invasive #infections with #Mycobacterium chimaera potentially associated with heater-cooler units used during #cardiac #surgery (@ECDC_EU, May 22 2015)

[Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), full page: (LINK). Edited.]

Epidemiological update: invasive infections with Mycobacterium chimaera potentially associated with heater-cooler units used during cardiac surgery [      ]

22 May 2015

On 21 May, Public Health England (PHE) reported that a retrospective investigation identified 13 patients with endocarditis, surgical site infection or disseminated infection with Mycobacterium chimaera or other Mycobacterium avium complex (MAC) species within four years of surgery involving cardiopulmorary bypass.

This follows a number of reports of such infections in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany. The conclusions of the ECDC risk assessment, published on 30 April, remain valid.

The patients identified in the UK had surgery in different hospitals between 2007 and 2014. According to the report published yesterday by Public Health England, ‘a definitive link between the heater-cooler units and the patient infections has not been established by the UK investigation’. Further microbiological investigations are underway. Microbiological investigations at multiple hospital sites in the UK have indicated that non-tuberculous mycobacteria have been found in the water within heater-cooler units and also been detected in the air around the units at some of these hospital sites.

Retrospective case detection and environmental investigations are ongoing to assess the risk and contribute to the development of effective preventive measures. A multinational collaboration for the implementation of a common protocol for case finding, laboratory diagnosis and environmental testing is aiming to support the collection of comparable data.

A set of control measures have been implemented in affected hospitals across Europe. These have included cleaning and decontamination of the heater-cooler units, relocating units outside operating theatres, implementation of protocols for daily water change and/or building customised housing with high-efficiency particulate air filters. In the Netherlands, elective cardiac surgery was postponed until implementation of preventive measures.

In addition, national regulatory authorities for medical devices have been notified in countries that have reported infections.

Healthcare providers involved in caring for patients who have undergone open-heart surgery or other surgical interventions involving cardiopulmonary bypass, such as lung transplant, should be vigilant for cases of endocarditis or other cardiovascular, deep-surgical-site or disseminated infection of unidentified origin. They should also consider testing specifically for slow-growing non-tuberculous mycobacteria such as M. chimaera. Regulatory bodies in charge of licensing and agencies monitoring the safety of heater-cooler units should be aware of the potential association of invasive cardiovascular infections caused by M. chimaera with heater-cooler units and relevant information should be disseminated to all centres performing cardiac surgery.



  1. Public Health England. Investigation of M. chimaera infection associated with cardiopulmonary bypass: an update 2015 [updated 21 May]. Health Protection Report, 9(18): news. Available from:
  2. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Invasive cardiovascular infection by Mycobacterium chimaera potentially associated with heater-cooler units used during cardiac surgery 2015 [updated 30 April]. Available from:
  3. Sax H, Bloemberg G, Hasse B, Sommerstein R, Kohler P, Achermann Y, et al. Prolonged outbreak of Mycobacterium chimaera infection after open chest heart surgery. Clinical Infectious Diseases. 2015 March 11, 2015.
  4. Products SAfT. Measures for improved patient safety in cardiac surgery 2014 [updated 14 July]. Available from:
  5. Isala. Isala heeft melding gedaan van besmetting hartpatiënt met M. chimaera bij Inspectie 2015 [cited 2015 23 April]. Available from:
  6. Robert Koch Institut. Informationen zu einem internationalen Ausbruchsgeschehen mit nicht-tuberkulösen Mykobakterien im Zusammenhang mit Temperaturregulierungsgeräten bei Herzoperationen 2015 [updated 30 April]. Available from:
  7. Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte (BfArM). Möglicher Zusammenhang zwischen Hypothermiegeräten und Infektionsrisiko mit Mykobakterien bei der Herzchirurgie 2015 [cited 2015 30 April]. Available from:



Weekly #US #Influenza #Surveillance #Report - 2014-2015 Influenza Season, Week 19 ending May 16, 2015 (@CDCgov, FluView, May 22 2015, extract)

[Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), FluView, full page: (LINK). Extract.]

Weekly U.S. Influenza Surveillance Report - 2014-2015 Influenza Season Week 19 ending May 16, 2015 [      ]

All data are preliminary and may change as more reports are received.



  • During week 19 (May 10-16, 2015), influenza activity continued to decrease in the United States.
    • Viral Surveillance: 
      • Of 6,553 specimens tested and reported by U.S. World Health Organization (WHO) and National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS) collaborating laboratories during week 19, 228 (3.5%) were positive for influenza.
    • Pneumonia and Influenza Mortality:
      • The proportion of deaths attributed to pneumonia and influenza (P&I) was below the epidemic threshold.
    • Influenza-associated Pediatric Deaths:
      • Three influenza-associated pediatric deaths were reported, including two influenza-associated pediatric deaths that occurred during the 2013-14 season.
    • Influenza-associated Hospitalizations:
      • A cumulative rate for the season of 65.5 laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 population was reported.
    • Outpatient Illness Surveillance:
      • The proportion of outpatient visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) was 1.3%, which is below the national baseline of 2.0%. All 10 regions reported ILI below region-specific baseline levels. Puerto Rico and one state experienced low ILI activity; New York City and 49 states experienced minimal ILI activity; and the District of Columbia had insufficient data.
    • Geographic Spread of Influenza:
      • The geographic spread of influenza in one state was reported as widespread; Guam and one state reported regional activity; Puerto Rico and nine states reported local activity; the District of Columbia and 31 states reported sporadic activity; and the U.S. Virgin Islands and eight states reported no influenza activity.


National and Regional Summary of Select Surveillance Components

[HHS Surveillance Regions* - Data for Current Week: Out-patient ILI† - Number of jurisdictions reporting regional or widespread activity§ - % Respiratory specimens positive for flu‡ - Data Cumulative Since September 28, 2014 (Week 40): A(H1N1)pdm09 - A (H3) - A(Subtyping not performed) – B - Pediatric Deaths]

  • Nation – Normal - 3 of 54 - 3.5% – 218 - 52,181 - 52,278 - 20,280 – 139
    • Region 1 – Normal - 1 of 6 - 6.3% – 11 - 2,971 - 2,925 - 1,025 – 3
    • Region 2 – Normal - 1 of 4 - 3.6% – 61 - 4,191 - 5,276 - 1,690 – 7
    • Region 3 – Normal - 0 of 6 - 4.7% – 15 - 6,210 - 4,829 - 1,195 – 10
    • Region 4 – Normal - 0 of 8 - 4.0% – 13 - 3,697 - 12,585 - 3,981 – 22
    • Region 5 – Normal - 0 of 6 - 7.4% – 17 - 8,345 - 8,510 - 3,759 – 29
    • Region 6 – Normal - 0 of 5 - 1.3% – 6 - 5,251 - 8,119 - 3,314 – 30
    • Region 7 – Normal - 0 of 4 - 3.3% – 10 - 1,784 - 2,465 - 1,157 – 7
    • Region 8 – Normal - 0 of 6 - 5.8% – 27 - 5,801 - 3,438 - 1,964 – 11
    • Region 9 – Normal - 1 of 5 - 6.7% – 45 - 9,673 - 3,412 - 1,643 – 17
    • Region 10 – Normal - 0 of 4 - 8.1% – 13 - 4,258 – 719 – 552 – 3


*HHS regions (Region 1 CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT; Region 2: NJ, NY, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands; Region 3: DE, DC, MD, PA, VA, WV; Region 4: AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN; Region 5: IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, WI; Region 6: AR, LA, NM, OK, TX; Region 7: IA, KS, MO, NE; Region 8: CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, WY; Region 9: AZ, CA, Guam, HI, NV; and Region 10: AK, ID, OR, WA).

† Elevated means the % of visits for ILI is at or above the national or region-specific baseline

§ Includes all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands

‡ National data are for current week; regional data are for the most recent three weeks


U.S. Virologic Surveillance

WHO and NREVSS collaborating laboratories located in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia report to CDC the number of respiratory specimens tested for influenza and the number positive by influenza virus type and influenza A virus subtype. The results of tests performed during the current week and totals for the influenza season to date are summarized in the table below. Region specific data are available at


[Week 19  - Data Cumulative since September 28, 2014 (Week 40)]

  • No. of specimens tested - 6,533 - 683,037
    • No. of positive specimens (%) - 228 (3.5%) - 124,958 (18.3%)
      • Positive specimens by type/subtype:
        • Influenza A - 28 (12.3%) - 104,678 (83.8%)
          • A(H1N1)pdm09 - 0 (0.0%) - 218 (0.2%)
          • H3 - 7 (25.0%) - 52,181 (49.8%)
          • Subytping not performed - 21 (75.0%) - 52,278 (49.9%)
        • Influenza B - 200 (87.7%) - 20,280 (16.2%)


INFLUENZA Virus Isolated


View National and Regional Level Graphs and Data

Since the start of the season, influenza A (H3N2) viruses have predominated nationally; however since early March, influenza B viruses have been reported more frequently than influenza A viruses. During week 19, 88% of all influenza positive specimens reported were influenza B viruses, and influenza B viruses predominated in all 10 regions.


Influenza Virus Characterization*

CDC has characterized 2,083 influenza viruses [59 A(H1N1)pdm09, 1,272 A(H3N2), and 752 influenza B viruses] collected by U.S. laboratories since October 1, 2014.

  • Influenza A Virus [1,331]
    • A (H1N1)pdm09 [59]:
      • All 59 H1N1 viruses tested were characterized as A/California/7/2009-like, the influenza A (H1N1) component of the 2014-2015 Northern Hemisphere influenza vaccine.
    • A (H3N2) [1,272]:
      • 244 (19.2%) of the 1,272 H3N2 viruses tested have been characterized as A/Texas/50/2012-like, the influenza A (H3N2) component of the 2014-2015 Northern Hemisphere influenza vaccine.
      • 1,028 (80.8%) of the 1,272 viruses tested showed either reduced titers with antiserum produced against A/Texas/50/2012 or belonged to a genetic group that typically shows reduced titers to A/Texas/50/2012.
      • Among viruses that showed reduced titers with antiserum raised against A/Texas/50/2012, most were antigenically similar to A/Switzerland/9715293/2013, the H3N2 virus selected for the 2015 Southern Hemisphere influenza vaccine.
      • A/Switzerland/9715293/2013 is related to, but antigenically and genetically distinguishable from, the A/Texas/50/2012 vaccine virus.
      • A/Switzerland-like H3N2 viruses were first detected in the United States in small numbers in March of 2014 and began to increase through the spring and summer.
  • Influenza B Virus [752]
    • 524 (69.7%) of the influenza B viruses tested belong to B/Yamagata/16/88 lineage and the remaining 228 (30.3%) influenza B viruses tested belong to B/Victoria/02/87 lineage.
      • Yamagata Lineage [524]:
        • 513 (97.9%) of the 524 B/Yamagata-lineage viruses were characterized as B/Massachusetts/2/2012-like, which is included as an influenza B component of the 2014-2015 Northern Hemisphere trivalent and quadrivalent influenza vaccines. Eleven (2.1%) of the B/Yamagata-lineage viruses tested showed reduced titers to B/Massachusetts/2/2012.
      • Victoria Lineage [228]:
        • 223 (97.8%) of the 228 B/Victoria-lineage viruses were characterized as B/Brisbane/60/2008-like, the virus that is included as an influenza B component of the 2014-2015 Northern Hemisphere quadrivalent influenza vaccine. Five (2.2%) of the B/Victoria-lineage viruses tested showed reduced titers to B/Brisbane/60/2008.


*CDC routinely uses hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays to antigenically characterize influenza viruses year-round to compare how similar currently circulating influenza viruses are to those included in the influenza vaccine, and to monitor for changes in circulating influenza viruses. However, a portion of recent influenza A(H3N2) viruses do not grow to sufficient hemagglutination titers for antigenic characterization by HI. For many of these viruses, CDC is also performing genetic characterization to infer antigenic properties.



Antiviral Resistance

Testing of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, A(H3N2), and influenza B virus isolates for resistance to neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir, zanamivir, and peramivir) is performed at CDC using a functional assay. Additional A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H3N2) clinical samples are tested for mutations of the virus known to confer oseltamivir resistance. The data summarized below combine the results of both testing methods. These samples are routinely obtained for surveillance purposes rather than for diagnostic testing of patients suspected to be infected with antiviral-resistant virus.

High levels of resistance to the adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine) persist among A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H3N2) viruses (the adamantanes are not effective against influenza B viruses). Therefore, data from adamantane resistance testing are not presented below.


Neuraminidase Inhibitor Resistance Testing Results on Samples Collected Since October 1, 2014

[Oseltamivir: Samples tested (n) - Resistant Viruses, Number (%) Zanamivir: Virus Samples tested (n) - Resistant Viruses, Number (%) Virus Peramivir: Virus Samples tested (n) - Resistant Viruses, Number (%)]

  • Influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 – 59 - 1 (1.7) – 53 - 0 (0.0) – 59 - 1 (1.7)
  • Influenza A (H3N2) - 3,187 - 0 (0.0) - 3,187 - 0 (0.0) - 1,678 - 0 (0.0)
  • Influenza B – 809 - 0 (0.0) – 809 - 0 (0.0) – 809 - 0 (0.0)


In the United States, the vast majority of recently circulating influenza viruses have been susceptible to the neuraminidase inhibitor antiviral medications, oseltamivir, zanamivir, and peramivir; rare sporadic instances of oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H3N2) viruses have been detected worldwide. Antiviral treatment is recommended as early as possible for patients with confirmed or suspected influenza who have severe, complicated, or progressive illness; who require hospitalization; or who are at high risk for serious influenza-related complications. Additional information on recommendations for treatment and chemoprophylaxis of influenza virus infection with antiviral agents is available at


Pneumonia and Influenza (P&I) Mortality Surveillance

During week 19, 6.0% of all deaths reported through the 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System were due to P&I. This percentage was below the epidemic threshold of 6.6% for week 19.


Pneumonia And Influenza Mortality


View Full Screen


Influenza-Associated Pediatric Mortality

Three influenza-associated pediatric deaths were reported to CDC during week 19. One death was associated with an influenza A virus for which no subtyping was performed and occurred during week 5 (the week ending February 7, 2015).

Two influenza-associated pediatric deaths reported during week 19 occurred during the 2013-14 season and bring the total number of reported pediatric deaths occurring during that season to 112. One death was associated with an influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 virus and one death was associated with an influenza B virus.

A total of 139 influenza-associated pediatric deaths have been reported during the 2014-2015 season from New York City [3] and 40 states (Alaska [1], Arizona [3], Arkansas [4], California [6], Colorado [6], Florida [3], Georgia [1], Illinois [3], Indiana [2], Iowa [3], Kansas [2], Kentucky [3], Louisiana [2], Maryland [1], Massachusetts [1], Michigan [2], Minnesota [10], Mississippi [1], Missouri [1], Nebraska [1], Nevada [8], New Jersey [1], New Mexico [1], New York [3], North Carolina [2], Ohio [6], Oklahoma [7], Oregon [1], Pennsylvania [3], Rhode Island [2], South Carolina [3], South Dakota [2], Tennessee [9], Texas [16], Utah [2], Virginia [5], Washington [1], Wisconsin [6], West Virginia [1], and Wyoming [1]).

Additional data can be found at:


Click on image to launch interactive tool


View Interactive Application


Influenza-Associated Hospitalizations

The Influenza Hospitalization Surveillance Network (FluSurv-NET) conducts population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed influenza-related hospitalizations in children younger than 18 years of age (since the 2003-2004 influenza season) and adults (since the 2005-2006 influenza season).


Between October 1, 2014 and April 30, 2015, 17,906 laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated hospitalizations were reported. The overall hospitalization rate was 65.5 per 100,000 population. The highest rate of hospitalization was among adults aged ≥65 years (322.8 per 100,000 population), followed by children aged 0-4 years (57.2 per 100,000 population). Among all hospitalizations, 15,282 (85.3%) were associated with influenza A, 2,458 (13.7%) with influenza B, 111 (0.6%) with influenza A and B co-infection, and 55 (0.3%) had no virus type information. Among those with influenza A subtype information, 5,508 (99.7%) were A(H3N2) and 16 (0.3%) were A(H1N1)pdm09.




Highly pathogenic #avian #influenza #H5, #Kazakhstan [1st occurrence, infected #wildbirds] (#OIE World Animal Health Information System, May 22 2015, edited)

[Source: OIE, full page: (LINK). Edited.]

Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5, Kazakhstan [      ]

Information received on 22/05/2015 from Dr Samat Tyulegenov, Deputy Director, RSE "National Reference Center for Veterinary", Ministry of Agriculture, ASTANA, Kazakhstan

  • Summary
    • Report type Immediate notification
    • Date of start of the event 12/05/2015
    • Date of confirmation of the event 12/05/2015
    • Report date 22/05/2015
    • Date submitted to OIE 22/05/2015
    • Reason for notification First occurrence of a listed disease
    • Manifestation of disease Clinical disease
    • Causal agent Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
    • Serotype H5
    • Nature of diagnosis Laboratory (advanced)
    • This event pertains to a defined zone within the country
  • New outbreaks (1)
    • Outbreak 1  - State Nature Reserve Akzhayik, GUR'YEV
      • Date of start of the outbreak 12/05/2015
      • Outbreak status Resolved (20/05/2015)
      • Epidemiological unit Not applicable
      • Affected animals: Species – Susceptible – Cases – Deaths – Destroyed – Slaughtered
        • Dalmatian pelican: Pelecanus crispus (Pelecanidae) – … – 2 – 2 – 0 – 0
    • Summary of outbreaks
      • Total outbreaks: 1
        • Total animals affected: Species – Susceptible – Cases – Deaths – Destroyed – Slaughtered
          • Dalmatian pelican: Pelecanus crispus (Pelecanidae) – … – 2 – 2 – 0 – 0
        • Outbreak statistics: Species - Apparent morbidity rate - Apparent mortality rate - Apparent case fatality rate - Proportion susceptible animals lost*
          • Dalmatian pelican: Pelecanus crispus (Pelecanidae) – ** – ** - 100.00% – **
          • *Removed from the susceptible population through death, destruction and/or slaughter
          • **Not calculated because of missing information
  • Epidemiology
    • Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection
      • Unknown or inconclusive
  • Control measures
    • Measures applied
      • Control of wildlife reservoirs
      • Screening
      • No vaccination
      • No treatment of affected animals
    • Measures to be applied
      • No other measures
  • Diagnostic test results
    • Laboratory name and type  - Species – Test - Test date – Result
      • National Veterinary Reference Center (National laboratory) - Dalmatian pelican - polymerase chain reaction (PCR) - 12/05/2015 – Positive
  • Future Reporting
    • The event is continuing. Weekly follow-up reports will be submitted.